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Chad M. Bauman 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Conversion to Christianity is one of the most politically charged issues in contemporary 
India and has recently been very much in the news.1 For example, in 2006, on the fiftieth 
anniversary of B. R. Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism2 hundreds of dalits gathered to 
convert, some to Buddhism and others to Christianity, rejecting Hinduism, a religion they 
claim oppresses and demeans them. In attacks on Christians in Orissa at the end of 2007 
(and associated reprisals), dozens of churches, homes, and businesses were destroyed, 
hundreds of people were injured, and thousands were displaced. In eastern Madhya 
Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, on which this paper focuses, conversion also stirs controversy. 
In the summer of 2006, the Madhya Pradesh state government tightened its regulations 
regarding conversion, requiring that both potential converts and those who would convert 
them should make their intentions clear to government officials well in advance. In 
Chhattisgarh, too, tensions over conversion to Christianity have occasionally led to 
isolated incidents of anti-Christian violence, most recently as an indirect effect of the 
December 2007 violence in nearby Orissa.  
Some Hindus, particularly those with sympathy for hindutva politics, see in conversions 
to Christianity the sinister strategy of a “foreign hand”—either that of the pope or, as V. 
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K. Shashikumar (2004) suggested in a recent Tehelka article, of George W. Bush, 
putative leader of (non-Catholic) Christians worldwide. It is difficult to disentangle the 
many factors involved in contemporary anti-conversion sentiment, and given the fact that 
nationalistic ardor often accompanies and informs such sentiment, it is not easy for 
scholars, whether Indian or non-Indian, to engage in research on the topic without 
becoming personally embroiled in the controversies that surround them.3 
It is therefore my intention to remove myself to some historical distance from 
contemporary events in order to investigate the phenomenon of conversion to Christianity 
(and resistance to it) from what I hope is the safe historical vantage point of the 1950s. 
The paper draws upon the Madhya Pradesh state government-sponsored Report of the 
Christian Missionary Activities Enquiry Committee (1956), known popularly as the 
Niyogi Report, after the name of its chairman, to argue that the ambivalence (and 
sometimes hostility) towards conversion to Christianity felt by many central Indian 
Hindus in this period was not merely the expression of inter-religious jealousy, but also, 
and perhaps more significantly, the manifestation of understandable postcolonial 
anxieties about the very survival and coherence of the Indian nation. 
It is of course immediately necessary to admit that distinguishing religious from 
political concerns is not particularly easy in this context (or any other in the modern 
world). As Anuradha Dingwaney Needham and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan assert in The 
Crisis of Secularism: 
 
Religion’s role in the modern world has been vastly reconstituted, so much so that 
religious debates and conflicts are no longer primarily waged over matters of belief, the 
true god, salvation, or other substantive issues of faith, as they once were; it is instead 
religion as the basis of identity and identitarian cultural practices—with co-religionists 
constituting a community, nation, or “civilization”—that comes to be the ground of 
difference and hence conflict (2007: 3; emphasis in original). 
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The Niyogi Committee’s work was commissioned by the Madhya Pradesh government 
and provoked by allegations that Christian missionaries were inducing lower-caste 
Hindus and tribal peoples to convert with promises of employment, education, or health 
and other social services. The resulting Report, based on two years of research and 
transcribing hundreds of extensive interviews with people from all over the state, 
suggested that large numbers of dalits and ådivås⁄s were converting to Christianity, that 
the number of Hindus in the region was declining, and that the ultimate goal of Christian 
evangelistic work was secession—either in the form of a Christian-dominated state 
within the Indian Union or an independent Christian nation along the lines of Pakistan.  
There had been a good number of mass movements to Christianity in India in the first 
half of the twentieth century, enough that the phenomenon could not be ignored. For 
example, several thousand Garas converted to Christianity in the 1920s and 1930s in 
Orissa and the eastern region of what is today Chhattisgarh (but which was at the time 
part of Madhya Pradesh) (Pickett, Warnshuis, Singh, and McGavran 1956). Though they 
had a more substantial effect elsewhere (such as the northeast),  these movements were 
not, in central India, sufficient to produce a significant shift in the religious demographics 
of the region, a fact which is probably more obvious in retrospect than it was at the time. 
Nevertheless, at the moment the trend seemed a rather alarming one to many central 
Indian Hindu nationalists. It is for this reason that I maintain that resistance to conversion 
to Christianity in this context emerged not out of concern for the spiritual state of 
converts so much as out of anxieties, real and perceived, about the survival of the 
fledgling Indian nation. These anxieties placed certain Hindus in a defensive posture, 
causing them to seek, as a bulwark against national disintegration, a primordial, 
unalterable, and unifying cultural essence. Given the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the 
Indian nation, which prevented unity on ethnic or linguistic grounds, many identified 
“Hindu-ness” (hindutva) as that unifying essence, an idea and a term suggested by V. D. 
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Savarkar’s influential tract, written in 1923, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (but which had 
less clearly articulated precursors). M. S. Golwalkar, influential leader of the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh, had also insisted in We or Our Nationhood Defined (1939) that 
minorities pledge their allegiance to symbols of Hindu identity, which he viewed as part 
and parcel of the Indian national identity (Jaffrelot 2007: 97). For Golwalkar, privatized 
religion, as Europeans understood it, was only a part of religion, which in the fullest 
sense was that which regulated society and which therefore has an important role to play 
in the political realm. These ideas still maintained currency for many Hindu nationalists 
in India in the 1950s. Hindutva, as Savarkar understood it, did not coincide exactly with 
Hinduism, but Hinduism remained an important element of hindutva, particularly in the 
popular imagination (Jaffrelot 2007: 15). To those who embraced such a definition of 
Indian unity, converts to Christianity (or Islam) were by definition foreigners, to be 
treated with suspicion as potential traitors, and at the very least represented a threat to 
national unity. While resistance to conversion was expressed in the idiom of religion (that 
is, preserving Hinduism), therefore, it was provoked by political concerns. The fact that 
the two cannot be easily disentangled reflects, as Needham and Sunder Rajan argue, the 
peculiar nature of religion in the modern period as well as the postcolonial context of 
1950s India. 
The Report remains an influential document today. As discussed below, it is often 
invoked by contemporary Hindu nationalists as an indication of the methods and goals of 
Christian missionaries, even contemporary missionaries. The Report was in fact 
republished as recently as 1998 by Voice of India, publishing house of the (recently 
deceased) Sita Ram Goel, because, as he claimed on another’s authority, “Christian 
missionaries had bought all available copies [of the original] and destroyed them” (1998: 
vii). Goel’s introduction frames the Report as one of four documents which created a “rift 
in the lute” of missionary propaganda and exposed the (in his view) pernicious methods 
and goals of missionaries.4 The other documents were K. M. Panikkar’s Asia and 
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Western Dominance (1953), Om Prakash Tyagi’s “Freedom of Religion Bill” (proposed 
unsuccessfully in the Lok Sabha in 1978), and Arun Shourie’s Missionaries in India 
(1994).  
Goel’s claims, and many of those recorded in the Report, are and were contested by 
many Christians and their supporters. It is therefore important to note that this article 
deals with perceptions of reality, not necessarily with reality itself. Nevertheless, 
perceptions of reality constitute their own kind of historical fact. Indeed, perceptions of 
reality may be a more important determinant of behavior than reality. It is for this reason 
that while this paper does not take every testimony recorded in the Report to be 
historically accurate—some in fact are quite outlandish—it does take them to be 
historically important and meaningful and therefore attempts to account for them with 
reference to the social and historical context in which they were given. The point of 
considering what probably amounts in some instances to misperception is not to 
perpetuate rumor and exaggeration, and the ill feelings associated with them, but rather to 
examine their origins and thereby, hopefully, to gain some better understanding not only 
of the Report’s historical context, but of our own as well. The article begins with a 
Prologue, which locates the present discussion in a wider historical and theoretical 
context, and then provides a brief overview of missionary work in the region before 
moving on to a fuller discussion of the Report and its implications. 
 
Historical Prologue 
 
There is nothing particularly unique about the 1950s, nor even about the postcolonial 
period with regard to concerns about the unity of India and Indians. Even before 
independence (in 1947), nationalist leaders struggled against the forces of potential 
disintegration. Mohandas K. Gandhi is of course known best for his leadership in the 
independence movement. But Gandhi knew that svaråj (self-rule) could never be 
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achieved by a divided community. He therefore put a great deal of effort into securing the 
widest unity possible.  
Indian Muslims represented one potential threat to unity, and Gandhi’s failure to 
convince Muhammad Ali Jinnah5 and other Muslims that they would be valued citizens 
of an independent India led in the end to Partition. Working to ensure the unity of 
untouchable and other Hindus also preoccupied Gandhi, for he feared that British divide-
and-rule politics might eventually separate the great mass of lower-caste Hindus from the 
rest of the Hindu community. Therefore, in 1932, when British Prime Minister Ramsay 
MacDonald announced the Communal Award, which provided separate electorates not 
only for Sikhs, Muslims, Anglo-Indians, Europeans, and Indian Christians, but also for 
“the depressed classes,” Gandhi protested by beginning a fast unto death from his jail cell 
in the Yeravda Prison. Within a few days Gandhi struck a compromise with Ambedkar, 
who had supported separate electorates, whereby the untouchables would vote with other 
Hindus but would receive a certain number of reserved seats in legislative assemblies 
(Coward 2003).  
At the same time and for similar reasons, members of the Årya Samåj and similar 
organizations were employing çuddhi, a purificatory or reconversion ceremony created 
with the approval of many orthodox Hindu Brahmins to help combat the evangelizing 
methods of Muslims and Christians and stem the tide of Hindu defections (Llewellyn 
1993: 99–103). Gandhi was also concerned that Christian and Muslim evangelizing might 
draw large numbers of the untouchables away from the Hindu fold. For this reason he 
became, in the 1930s and 1940s, increasingly opposed to mission work, especially that 
aimed at converting Hindus (Harper 2000: 292–345). In 1937, for example, Gandhi 
called the evangelistic efforts of Vedanayagam Azariah, first Indian Bishop of the 
Anglican Church, “anti-national” (Frykenberg 2003: 7–8). 
In the Constituent Assembly discussions (1946–50) Hindu lobbies pressed for a 
constitutional ban on conversion, fearing that Hinduism, portrayed as a non-proselytizing 
The Political Roots of Anti-Conversion Sentiment in Central India  /  7 
religion, would be overtaken by Islam and Christianity. This fear of conversion, Gauri 
Viswanathan argues, “produced a strange marriage between Gandhi and the Hindu 
nationalists, who in all other instances denounced him for making concessions to 
Muslims but nonetheless heralded him as the voice of reason when he opposed Christian 
proselytism” (2007: 335). Despite their concerns, however, Article 25, Section I of the 
eventual Constitution gave everyone in India (whether citizens or non-citizens) the right 
“to profess, practise and propagate religion.”  
Concerns about the integrity of the Indian nation that was coming into being therefore 
informed inter-communal relations even before the 1950s, and they continued to do so 
even long afterwards. Sometimes this concern was a factor in tensions between Hindus 
and other communities. For example, a key component of the anti-Sikh riots in 1984, 
argues Rajni Kothari (1985), was the belief, among Hindus, that Sikhs were “more like 
enemies than friends, that they were the cause of national disintegration” (cited in 
Tambiah 1997: 108). Some Sikhs had called for an independent “Khalistan,” and largely 
Christianized tribal communities in India’s northeast continue to call for their own 
independence today. Because of this and other factors, Ainslie T. Embree argues that 
India’s natural concern for territorial integrity has taken and continues to take on a 
“religious coloring” (1990: 47). Despite being grounded in events which took place in 
central India in the 1950s, therefore, the analysis which follows is also of more general 
relevance to discussions regarding twentieth and twenty-first century inter-communal 
tensions in India. 
 
Mission Work in the Region 
 
Given the topic of the Report of the Christian Missionary Activities Enquiry Committee, 
it is necessary at this juncture to say a few words about mission work in the region. As 
indicated above, the Report focused on the state of Madhya Pradesh, where in 1955, as 
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the Niyogi Committee was gathering its data, thirty-two Protestant missionary 
organizations were at work (National Christian Council of India 1955: 119–21). Nearly 
all of these organizations were of foreign origin, staffed at least in part by foreign 
missionaries and funded from abroad. Nevertheless, roughly half were by this time under 
Indian leadership. A few of the missions were sponsored by Indian churches that had 
recently been established by foreign missionaries, such as the Mennonite Church in India, 
which grew from the work of the American Mennonite Mission, or the United Church of 
Northern India, a conglomeration of Indian Protestant denominations, the most important 
regional partner of which was the American Evangelical Mission of the Evangelical and 
Reformed Church. Still other missions, such as the Mar Thoma Evangelistic Association, 
were associated with denominations that had a much longer Indian history. The 1951 
Census of India recorded 88,000 Protestants in the state, 62 percent of them in the eastern 
half which, in 2000, became the state of Chhattisgarh (National Christian Council of 
India 1955: 38). Roman Catholics were also prominent in Madhya Pradesh. 
Of the Protestant missionary organizations active in Madhya Pradesh at the time of the 
Report, the largest in terms of converts and educational, medical, and other service-
oriented institutions were the Methodist Episcopal Church, which had established a 
mission in Khandwa in 1905 (Harper 1936: 71), the United Church of Northern India, the 
Disciples of Christ United Christian Missionary Society, and the American Mennonite 
Mission (World Missionary Atlas 1925: 104ff; National Christian Council of India 1955: 
119ff). The last three of these four were active in areas on which this paper focuses, the 
Chhattisgarh region of eastern Madhya Pradesh, which was roughly coterminous with the 
contemporary state of Chhattisgarh. For this reason I will say a brief word about each of 
them.  
As indicated above, the most significant member of the United Church of Northern 
India in Chhattisgarh was the American Evangelical Mission of the Evangelical and 
Reformed Church (hereafter the Evangelical Mission). The Evangelical Mission was 
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established by six small German immigrant denominations in the United States, which 
would eventually join the (German) Evangelical Synod of North America (Bauman 2004: 
65). The Evangelical Synod of North America merged with the Reformed Church in 1934 
to become the Evangelical and Reformed Church (which later joined the United Church 
of Christ). In 1865 members of those six original denominations met in New Jersey and 
decided to send Reverend Oskar Lohr as a missionary to India. Lohr had in fact 
previously been a missionary in Chhota Nagpur with the Gossner Lutheran Mission, but 
had to abandon his post during the Indian Mutiny (or First War of Independence). 
Arriving in India in 1868, Lohr and his family decided to establish a mission station in 
Raipur, which is now the capitol of Chhattisgarh, and to work among the low-caste 
Camars, most of whom were by this time followers of a deceased nineteenth-century 
reforming Hindu named Guru Ghås⁄dås and were calling themselves Satnamis. The 
Evangelical Mission grew slowly until the end of the nineteenth century, though Lohr and 
the missionaries who joined him continued to open new stations in the region and 
founded a number of schools, orphanages, hospitals, and a printing press (Bauman 2004: 
65–70).  
In 1885 the Disciples of Christ, who had previously been working in western Madhya 
Pradesh, opened a mission station in Bilaspur (now the second largest city in 
Chhattisgarh). Though the mission did not explicitly target the Satnamis, most of its 
earliest converts came from that community. And as on the Evangelical Mission field, the 
Disciples of Christ gained few converts until the famines, though they too continued to 
extend their stations into rural areas (Bauman 2004: 73–75).  
A series of devastating famines in 1896–97 and 1898–99 provoked large numbers of 
conversions on both the Evangelical and the Disciples of Christ mission fields, in part 
because it produced in some Hindus a crisis of faith and in part because the missions 
administered government work projects which supplied the destitute with jobs and food. 
During the first famine, Evangelical missionaries were feeding over 9,000 famine victims 
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a day with government funds (Seybold 1971: 41, 42). Hindus became Christian in droves, 
though large numbers of them eventually reverted to Hinduism. Of the 2,000 people 
baptized by Evangelical missionaries during the famines (1897–1900), for example, 
around 600 later reverted to Hinduism (Pickett, Warnshuis, Singh, and McGavran 1956: 
87). The missions established orphanages which were immediately filled to capacity. 
Though both the Evangelical and the Disciples of Christ missions experienced decline in 
the first decade of the twentieth century (due largely to post-famine reconversions), they 
continued to grow steadily thereafter until the period of the Report. By 1945 there were, 
between the two missions, roughly 10,000 Christian adults (Bauman 2004: 78).  
In the period leading up to India’s political independence, the desire for ecclesiastical 
autonomy among Indian Christians on the Evangelical and the Disciples of Christ 
mission stations grew considerably. Accordingly, in 1925, the Evangelical Mission 
organized the India Mission District, merging leadership of the mission and Indian 
church. In 1938 leaders of the India Mission District decided to join the United Church of 
North India, which the United Church of Canada, the Presbyterian Churches of Canada, 
England, Ireland, New Zealand and Wales, the Church of Scotland, the London 
Missionary Society, the Congregational Churches of America, and the Moravian Church 
had already joined (Seybold 1971: 102). In 1947 Indians were given full responsibility 
for evangelical work in the United Church of North India, and by 1954, when the Niyogi 
Committee began its work, all authority had been transferred to Indian hands, though 
several foreign missionaries were still working under the direction of Indian leaders. The 
Disciples of Christ devolution of authority followed a similar pattern, though the 
Disciples did not join the United Church of North India until after it had been merged, in 
1970, with the Church of North India (Seybold 1971: 102–9).  
The American Mennonite Mission was opened in Dhamtari, south of Raipur, in 1899 
and was therefore shaped by the famines right from its inception. Though the Mennonites 
had intended only to open an orphanage and a hospital, famine exigencies demanded a far 
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more extensive and hasty development of the mission. Almost immediately, the mission 
began administering British government funds to employ 9,000 workers and feed 14,000 
hungry victims of famine (Lapp 1972: 44–46). The mission did establish orphanages for 
famine victims but received far more orphans than it had expected. By 1900 there were 
389 orphans under Mennonite care (Lapp 1972: 101–2). Despite the swift growth of 
mission institutions, however—the mission opened a widows’ home, established schools, 
built several leprosaria, and bought a village in the first decades of the twentieth 
century—the mission received far fewer converts than the Evangelical or the Disciples in 
Christ mission fields. As many as 85 percent of those who did become Christian were 
either orphans or students in the mission-run schools (Lapp 1972: 119). Moreover, the 
composition of the Mennonite community was far more diverse than that of either the 
Evangelical or the Disciples of Christ communities. For example, the 1936 Annual 
Report of the American Mennonite Mission indicates that of the converts on the mission 
field, 35 percent were Telis, 20 percent were Gonds, 12 percent were Camars, 9 percent 
were Mahars, and the rest belonged to other castes (Lapp 1972: 127). Nevertheless, as on 
the Evangelical and the Disciples missions, the vast majority of converts came from the 
lower castes or, in the case of the Gonds, from ådivås⁄ groups. By 1955 there were 1,479 
Christians in 11 congregations in Indian Mennonite congregations in the region (Lapp 
1972: 166). 
The Mennonites began, earlier than most missions, to attempt a transfer of authority to 
Indian hands. A “home mission” was established in 1917. The home mission was 
envisioned as an evangelical agency to be funded and directed by Indian Christians 
themselves. The plan failed twice, however, before finally abandoned in 1937 (Lapp 
1972: 163). At the same time, a committee had been formed to investigate full devolution 
of the mission. In 1940 properties were transferred to the India Mennonite Conference, 
and an ultimately unsuccessful power-sharing constitution was tested in the 1940s. Its 
failure provoked a period of some tension between Indian and American Mennonites 
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(Lapp 1972: 183–89), but finally, in 1952, the American Mennonite Mission ceased to 
exist, though American Mennonites continued for some years to support Indian 
Mennonites with funds and missionaries (Lapp 1972: 188).  
Until the establishment of a Catholic hierarchy in India in 1886, Nagpur (currently in 
Madhya Pradesh) was a suffragan of Madras, which was an archiepiscopal see. At the 
same time, the Calcutta diocese was expanding westward into the Chhota Nagpur plain, 
which lies just east of Chhattisgarh (Capuchin Mission Unit 1923: 153). (The Chhota 
Nagpur mission field will be discussed in more detail below.) Until the end of the 
nineteenth century, therefore, the region of Chhattisgarh was on the margins of Roman 
Catholic evangelical work in India. A year after the establishment of a Catholic 
hierarchy, though, Nagpur became a diocese (in 1953 it became an archdiocese). Later, 
dioceses were established in Raigarh-Ambikapur (1951), Jabalpur (1954), and Amravati 
(or “Amraoti,” today in Maharashtra, 1955). As with the Protestant missions, the Roman 
Catholic church grew slowly until the very end of the nineteenth century, when the rate of 
conversions increased (Capuchin Mission Unit 1923: 159). The famines were surely a 
factor in that increase, as was the quality of Catholic education and the advocacy of 
Catholics on behalf of oppressed ådivås⁄ peasants in the far northeast of Chhattisgarh and 
eastwards into the Chhota Nagpur plain (in and around today’s states of Jharkhand, 
Bihar, and Orissa). In the year the Report was published, the Madhya Pradesh dioceses 
collectively claimed to serve over 100,000 Catholics (Pothacamury 1957: 62–63). Today 
about one out of 11 Catholics in India reside in the Chhota Nagpur region (Shourie 2007: 
19). 
 
The Report of the Christian Missionary Activities Enquiry Committee 
 
Seven years after India’s independence, the government of Madhya Pradesh noticed a 
dramatic increase in complaints about the activities of Christian missionaries, particularly 
The Political Roots of Anti-Conversion Sentiment in Central India  /  13 
in its northeastern regions, in and around the formerly princely states that had been 
merged into Madhya Pradesh in January 1948 (Report I.6).6 These complaints generally 
involved the claim, in one form or another, that missionaries in the region were 
employing “force, fraud, or…illicit means” (Report I.163) to win converts from among 
the “illiterate aboriginals and other backward people” (167). When the state government 
inquired, Christians denied the claims and asserted that in fact the Christian community 
was being persecuted and harassed by the Hindu majority. Dismayed (and probably 
seeking political gain vis-à-vis the more secular Congressites who controlled the Madhya 
Pradesh government at the time), the Jana Sangh in Madhya Pradesh launched an “Anti-
Foreign Missionary Week” in protest. The protest was called off when the government 
announced its planned enquiry (Jaffrelot 1996: 164).  
Ostensibly to investigate all of these claims, the government of Madhya Pradesh 
resolved, on April 14, 1954, to constitute a committee charged with conducting a 
thorough inquiry (Fox 2006; Kim 2003: 60–61). The committee, and the report which it 
produced two years later (1956), came to be known by the name of its Chairman, 
Bhawani Shankar Niyogi, a retired chief justice of the High Court at Nagpur. But the 
official publication name, Report of the Christian Missionaries Activity Enquiry 
Committee, perhaps indicates the focus of the investigation.  
Over the next two years, the Committee made two extensive tours of the state, 
contacting over 11,000 people in 77 locations, interviewing several hundred of them on 
the record (although in public fora), and accepting written testimonies from 375 others 
(Report I.2). The Committee also drafted and widely distributed a detailed questionnaire, 
385 copies of which were returned. Of these, 55 were from Christians and 330 from non-
Christians. These were all gathered together in the Committee’s Report, which ran to 
nearly 1,000 pages. 
A paragraph in the report itself summarizes the perceptions that the Committee 
encountered during its travels: 
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There was no disparagement of Christianity or of Jesus Christ, and no objection to the 
preaching of Christianity and even to conversions to Christianity. The objection was to 
the illegitimate methods alleged to be adopted by the Missionaries for this purpose, 
such as offering allurements of free education and other facilities to children attending 
their schools, adding some Christian names to their original Indian names, marriages 
with Christian girls, money-lending, distributing Christian literature in hospitals and 
offering prayers in the wards of in-door patients. Reference was also made to the 
practice of the Roman Catholic priests or preachers visiting new-born babies to give 
“ashish” (blessings) in the name of Jesus, taking sides in litigation or domestic quarrels, 
kidnapping of minor children and abduction7 of women and recruitment of labour for 
plantations in Assam or Andaman as a means of propagating the Christian faith among 
the ignorant and illiterate people.…The concentration of Missionary enterprise on the 
hill tribes in remote and inaccessible parts of the forest areas and their mass conversion 
with the aid of foreign money were interpreted as intended to prepare the ground for a 
separate independent State on the lines of Pakistan (Report I.3). 
 
Based on its findings, the Committee made a number of recommendations to the 
Madhya Pradesh government. Among them were that missionaries whose primary aim 
was proselytism be asked to withdraw; that all religious bodies involved in conversion be 
registered with the government; that the government control, through licenses, the 
publication of religious “propaganda” (that is, publications); that potential converts 
obtain the approval of a statewide board constituted for this purpose; and that a law be 
passed prohibiting the use of medical or “other professional services” for making 
converts (Report I.153–65). 
As is perhaps already clear, the Committee was not entirely unbiased. Hindus 
associated with conservative groups like the Hindu Mahasabha, which were 
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fundamentally opposed to the spread of Christianity, were responsible both for the 
instigation of the Report and for some of its most radical assertions. There was in fact one 
Christian on the Committee, but Christians complained that he did not adequately 
represent and advocate their position (Report I.170–71). Of the Hindus on the 
Committee, one was a well-known member of the Årya Samåj and a frequent critic of 
Christian missionaries (Menon 1999). Moreover, many of the most anti-Christian 
testimonies recorded in the Report were provided by upper-caste Hindus who naturally 
(and correctly) perceived, in the conversion of ådivås⁄s and lower-caste Hindus to 
Christianity, the decline of their power and influence. Finally, witnesses sometimes 
claimed that missionaries employed tactics which most missionaries had long since 
rejected. None of the testimonies, with one or two rare exceptions, were subjected to 
cross-examination. Moreover, whereas most of the Christian claims of harassment were 
dismissed outright by the Committee as spurious and baseless, the Hindu testimonies 
were largely accepted at face value by the Committee. The testimonies contained within 
the Report must therefore be taken as a chronicle of opinion, not of historical fact. 
Nevertheless, all historiography rests tenuously on the sometimes biased and inaccurate 
testimonies and recollections of those from the historical period in question, and the task 
of the historian is therefore to attend to as many voices as possible, particularly those 
(such as the subaltern) which are often silenced in official chronicles.  
Moreover, the questionnaire distributed by the Committee would fail miserably if it 
were held up to modern sociological standards, primarily because it repeatedly asks 
leading and even baiting questions. One question, for example, is, “What, to your 
knowledge, are the methods used for conversion?” So far so good. But the second part of 
the question is, “Are any of the following methods used?” Suggestions are then given for 
what kinds of methods might be employed: advancing loans, promising free facilities, 
promising help in litigation, offering employment, holding out hopes of better marriages, 
threatening danger of eternal damnation, and so on (Report II.A.182).  
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One particularly eloquent Catholic respondent to the questionnaire accused it, with 
some justification, of “perfidious suggestion” (Report II.A.200) and “barefaced 
impertinence” (203) and added, “Surely, the members of the Committee are fully aware 
that such a series of veiled charges—for often these are not questions, but scarcely veiled 
accusations—is a potent means to exacerbate sectarian feeling, and to incite religious 
fanatics to lay charges against those whom they dislike, yes, false charges without 
number” (198). In fact, Catholic Christians were so embittered by the work of the 
Committee that they requested the government of Madhya Pradesh to discontinue it. The 
appeal was denied, so Catholics in the state were directed by Eugene D’Souza, 
archbishop of Nagpur, to cease cooperating with the Committee’s enquiry. (Copies of 
Catholic correspondence with the Madhya Pradesh government and the Niyogi 
Committee are included in the Report [II.B.1–49].) Many Protestant groups, on the other 
hand, continued to cooperate with the Committee’s research, hoping that by doing so they 
might influence it favorably.  
Nevertheless, while the questionnaire may have been flawed, and while some of the 
testimonies recorded by the Committee may have been biased and others simply 
fabricated, what strikes the reader first is the great erudition and—much of the time—
fairness and sympathy exhibited by members of the Committee in the analytical sections 
of the Report. This is particularly so in parts of the Report which cover the history of 
Christianity, Christian ecumenism, Christian missions, and missionary strategy in India 
and beyond. The Committee did its homework. It read scores of reports from local 
missionary bodies as well as from international ones such as the International Missionary 
Council. J. W. Pickett, Roland Allen, William Hocking, M. M. Thomas, and Arnold 
Toynbee make appearances in the Committee’s footnotes, as do reports from the 
meetings of the International Missionary Council at Whitby and Tambaram. The 
Committee’s reading list, as the list of names mentioned above indicates, was decidedly 
skewed in the direction of writers who were critical of various aspects of contemporary 
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missionary practice, and, to be fair, the Report generally did not adequately acknowledge 
the fact that Pickett, Allen, and others were mission insiders seeking to improve 
missionary practice (rather than do away with it altogether). Nevertheless, the Report 
often compliments missionaries for their accomplishments. More than once it recognizes 
contributions missionaries had made to Indian society and even waxes eloquent about the 
potential greatness of a “real welding of Indian spirituality and Hebrew ethics” (Report 
I.159).  
It is difficult to judge the effect, if any, of the Report on Hindu-Christian relations in 
the region. Many nationalistic Hindus welcomed the report, some declaring that it had 
“exposed” or “disrobed” (naπgå kar diyå hai) and thereby disgraced the missionaries and 
the missionary enterprise in general (Goel 1998: vii). Whether caused by the Report or 
not, tensions did continue to mount between Hindus and Christians, particularly in the 
eastern part of the state. A year after the Report was published a Christian hostel and 
social service institution founded by Evangelical missionaries in Raipur (now the capitol 
of Chhattisgarh), the Gass Memorial Centre, was looted, burned, and destroyed by a mob. 
There were local and specific causes, but these seem to have merely held a match to the 
powder keg of strained inter-communal relations (Bauman 2004: 291–93, 2008: 237–39).  
At the national level the Report reopened debates about conversion and the 
Constitution. Its suggestion, for example, that the right to convert be limited to Indian 
citizens (and not extended to foreigners) emboldened Hindu nationalists who had never 
fully accepted the Constitution’s protection of the right of religious propagation. 
Viswanathan (2007: 336) argues that the Report was one factor in a 1977 Supreme Court 
Ruling which specified that the right to propagate religion did not necessarily include the 
right to convert and which allowed states to produce “Freedom of Religion” bills 
requiring potential Hindu converts to indicate their intent to local officials.  
Such bills, some of which had already been legislated, contained language influenced 
by that of the Report’s recommendations (Jaffrelot 2007: 234). For example, “Freedom of 
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Religion” acts legislated in Orissa (1967) and Madhya Pradesh (1968) take the Report’s 
recommendation that the government establish “suitable control on conversions brought 
about through illegal means” (I.160), such as force, fraud, and inducement, and prohibit 
(in words shared by the two acts) “conversion from one religion to another by the use of 
force or allurement or by fraudulent means.…” The Arunachal Pradesh “Freedom of 
Religion” Act, passed in 1978, uses similar language, forbidding conversions “by the use 
of force or by inducement or by any fraudulent means.” 
Since that time, the Report has become a touchstone of debates on conversion in India. 
On one side stand Hindu nationalists, for many of whom mere mention of the Report is 
deemed evidence enough that conversions to Christianity were and are still today (despite 
fifty intervening years) largely the result of force, fraud, and inducement and that the 
ådivås⁄s and lower-caste Hindus were and are being lured to Christianity in large 
numbers by promises of money, education, healthcare, and other social services, not for 
“spiritual” reasons. Members of the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party in Rajasthan, for 
example, recently reintroduced an anti-conversion bill in the state House. According to 
the Times of India, one party member, “quoted the 1954 report of the Niyogi Commission 
and said that the population of Christians in India was increasing” (Times News Network 
2008). 
Arun Shourie, economist, former government minister, and former editor of the Indian 
Express, is perhaps the best-known and most eloquent of those who use the Report in 
such a way. His Missionaries in India, first published in 1994, is a pointed but relatively 
restrained critique of Christianity and mission work in India, which grew out of a lecture 
he was invited to deliver to a meeting of the Catholic Bishops Conference of India in 
January 1994. Shourie quotes repeatedly and extensively from the Report to establish 
what he considers the modus operandi of missionaries in India and asserts that very little 
has changed since the 1950s. The targets of missionary work (that is, ignorant and 
impecunious ådivås⁄s and dalits) remain the same, he claims, as do the means of 
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conversion (allurement through social services and denigration of Hinduism) and the 
problems attendant upon these means, such as a high rate of superficial and materialistic 
conversion (and therefore reconversion), and the perception among non-Christians that 
Christianity is inappropriately associated with (foreign) power and wealth (Shourie 2007: 
8–9, 19, 28, 33, 179–202). 
On the other side of the debate stand those who feel the Niyogi Committee’s Report 
was biased from the start, and therefore both neglected the many good things Christians 
had done and inaccurately portrayed missionary work in the region. In a speech to the 
Catholic Council of India on December 2, 2007, for example, John Dayal, member of the 
National Integration Council and president of the All-India Catholic Union, argued: 
 
Ravi Shankar [chief minister of Madhya Pradesh at the time of the Report] and Niyogi 
[were] both pathologically hostile to Christianity. Their target was the Catholic Church, 
working among tribals who they and their group had been exploiting for decades. The 
All India Catholic Union’s associations in the state, really active Catholic Associations 
gave extensive documentation. As did the Church. But the report was a forgone 
conclusion. Acting on it Madhya Pradesh passed the Religious Freedom Act affectively 
[sic] banning all conversions, and as effectively coercing the Tribals to espouse the 
Hindu faith, a practice the Sangh Parivar codified in its criminal Ghar Wapsi 
programme.  
 
Many Indian Christians also assert that missionary methods have changed substantially 
since the 1950s and that it is therefore unfair to condemn contemporary Christians with 
evidence from that era. Moreover, they ask rhetorically whether Hindu nationalists, a 
good number of whom were educated in Christian schools, would prefer that Christians 
did not offer the social services they did.  
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Criticism of the Report and those who wield it as evidence and support in anti-
conversion campaigns has come from other quarters, too. In an article entitled “Literacy 
and Conversion in the Discourse of Hindu Nationalism,” Gauri Viswanathan assails the 
Report for: 
 
highlighting loss of control over free will through weakness, ignorance, and poverty as 
a reason for outlawing conversion altogether, since it left the economically deprived 
sectors of Indian society particularly vulnerable to the inducements of converting to 
another religion.…The Niyogi Comission’s landmark report set the lines of an 
argument that have continued to the present day, blurring the lines between force and 
consent and giving very little credence to the possibility that converts change over to 
another religion because they choose to (2007: 336–37; emphasis added). 
 
Countering those who see in Christian social services an unacceptable inducement to 
conversion, and drawing upon Amartya Sen’s conviction that access to basic health and 
educational services are a universal human right, Viswanathan asserts, “It can and should 
be argued that if missionaries give people services they would otherwise not have had, no 
one has a right to restrict their activities, particularly when there are no other state-
supported or private initiatives” (2007: 347).  
The Report is therefore embroiled in contemporary academic debates about power and 
agency as well as in wide-ranging political controversies involving disagreements about 
civil rights, the nature and utility of secularism in India, and the nature of Indian-ness 
itself. It is for this reason worth taking the time to situate the Report, as I now do, in its 
historical context and in that light interpret its findings, recommendations, and rhetoric.  
 
Causes of Postcolonial Anxiety 
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In India around 1954 there was a great deal of national anxiety. To some extent this 
anxiety can be traced to the effects of living for several centuries under foreign rule. 
Kenneth W. Jones argues, for example, that “As a result of centuries of foreign 
domination the Hindu community, in spite of its majority status, took on many of the 
attitudes that are typical of suppressed minorities” (1981: 448). Yet I am interested not so 
much in the lingering psychological effects of colonization as on the perceived threats to 
Indian survival in the 1950s (though the two are clearly related). In this period the nation 
was still militarily insecure and the threat of disintegration was real. It should therefore 
be clear that I am not suggesting that Indian “anxiety” or “insecurity” at this time was 
merely a sign of some collective psychosis. Rather, this sense of insecurity was grounded 
in very real regional, national, and geopolitical threats. In the mid-1950s there were a 
number of internal threats to Indian security. The formerly quasi-independent princely 
states had only recently, in 1948, become part of the Indian Union, one of them 
(Hyderabad) requiring some unfriendly persuasion. The Nagas were fighting for more 
autonomy in Assam, a threat to which the government responded with military 
intervention in 1955. The Portuguese had not yet agreed to accede Goa, which led to yet 
another military intervention in 1961. The final status of Kashmir also had yet to be 
settled.  
External politics also threatened to destabilize the young country. Just before receiving 
independence, the land of India had been divided, by order of the British Radcliffe 
Award, into Pakistan and India, after a hasty and controversial process that many Indians 
viewed at the time as the last and most pernicious of colonial intrusions. Moreover, 
despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that many Indians at the time viewed Partition as 
a tragic amputation of their homeland, relations quickly soured between the two new 
states, leaving India wedged between the unfriendly wings of East and West Pakistan.  
Cold war powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, played chess with weak and 
formerly colonized states in the region in their ambitions for world domination, and both 
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set their eyes on South Asia. In 1954 the United States’ decision to sign a Mutual 
Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan gave un-aligned India a specific reason to 
worry and raised anxiety about the possibility of direct or indirect American aggression. 
India tightened its rules regarding the granting of visas to foreigners, in particular to 
Americans and American missionaries. One Niyogi Committee witness proclaimed: 
“[The] majority of region [sic] missionaries are Americans and due to Pakistan-American 
pact their activities are suspicious” (Report II.A.139). Whether the tightened rules 
reflected genuine suspicion or were merely a retaliatory measure, they were officially 
justified on the former grounds.  
Indian and foreign Christians were often perceived by Hindus to be on the wrong side 
of these conflicts or potential conflicts. For example, as the Niyogi Committee reported, 
though many Hindu Indians were in favor of annexing Goa, a Catholic periodical, 
Nishkalank, asked in August 1950, “Why does India desire that Portugal which has been 
exercising sovereignty for 400 years over Goa should surrender it?…Only a handful of 
Goans…are shouting for the merger of Goa with India” (Report I.126). In addition, the 
independence movement in Assam had come about, it was widely perceived, as a result 
of the Christianization of Naga tribes. And of course the memory of British colonialism 
associated Christianity, in the mind of many Hindu Indians, with imperialism. The 
apparent neo-colonial aspirations of the United States, another “Christian” nation, simply 
reinforced the impression.  
Stanley J. Tambiah contends that in the decades after independence, the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh considered four groups of people enemies of the Hindu nation: 
“Indian followers of foreign religions, such as Islam and Christianity; Communists and 
their sympathizers; westernized members of the Indian intelligentsia; and foreign 
powers” (1996: 246). Christianity was associated, in the minds of many Indians, with all 
of these groups except the Communists. It is not surprising, therefore, that Christianity 
fell under suspicion in Madhya Pradesh and elsewhere among India’s Hindu nationalists. 
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To make matters worse, the secular-minded government of independent India had taken 
what some Hindus considered to be an overly acquiescent stance towards the spread of 
Christianity. India’s Constitution granted all citizens “Liberty of thought, expression, 
belief, faith and worship” and “Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and 
propagation of religion” subject of course to “public order, morality and health.” Some 
Hindus worried that these constitutional rights had been interpreted too liberally, 
allowing even foreign missionaries to attack Hindu beliefs and practices under the guise 
of religious freedom. Writers of the Report expressed astonishment that Christians would, 
as they saw it, abuse their rights after India had granted all communities religious 
freedom despite the objectionable “methods used by foreigners under a foreign 
Government,” the fact that Christians, as they saw it, did not participate in the national 
struggle “apart from a man here or a man there,” and the belief that “backdoor methods to 
sabotage the national movement may have been used” (Report I.95). 
The Report itself asked, “Can any right thinking man assert that such vile attacks on the 
religion of the majority community in India [are] part of Christian religion or [are] 
conducive to public order or morality?” (I.121). In fact, one of the recommendations 
made by the Report (I.89) was that the Constitution stipulate that these rights extended 
only to citizens of India and not foreign missionaries.  
To many like-minded Hindus, Jawaharlal Nehru, first prime minister of India, himself 
was ultimately to blame. His uncompromising secularism led him to block the Indian 
Conversion (Regulation and Registration) Bill before the Indian parliament in 1954, 
which would have made conversion from one community to another more difficult. In 
fact, on October 17, 1952 he actually distributed a letter to his chief ministers instructing 
them to clamp down on the harassment of Christians in their states. 
In addition to these national concerns, Madhya Pradesh had a few of its own. In January 
1948 the formerly princely states of Raigarh, Udaipur,8 Jashpur, and Surguja were 
merged into Madhya Pradesh, greatly increasing the population of ådivås⁄s in the now 
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enlarged state. Before the merger, 18 percent of Madhya Pradesh’s population had been 
ådivås⁄. In the former princely states the figure was around 53 percent (Report I.6). In the 
Chhattisgarh region of eastern Madhya Pradesh, the majority of converts to Christianity 
came from the ådivås⁄ peoples and the Hindu lower castes. Many missionary groups 
therefore consciously or unconsciously concentrated their efforts on such communities, 
where the response to evangelistic work was often the greatest. The princely states, 
however, had been given some measure of autonomy in their agreements with the British 
Government and those in this region had managed, for the most part, to prevent the 
entrance of missionary groups into their territories through anti-missionary legislation. 
Udaipur, for example, had promulgated the “Anti-conversion Act of Udaipur” on July 9, 
1946. The Act stipulated that no priests were allowed to enter except once a quarter, for 
48 hours—and only with prior permission—in order to celebrate mass with Christian 
communities near the border. Some missionaries disobeyed this and similar legislation 
(Pothacamury 1957: 63). After the merger, however, the legislation of the former 
princely states gave way to that of Madhya Pradesh and the Indian Union (where no such 
legislation existed). No longer constrained by anti-missionary laws, missionaries 
inundated the formerly closed regions, often to attend to Christian communities which 
had established themselves despite the absence of missionary work. Inter-communal 
conflict and conversions to Christianity increased dramatically, as did concerns that the 
rapidly Christianizing region would demand autonomy. It eventually did, and it is to that 
movement that we now turn. 
 
The Jharkhand Movement 
 
Even before independence, ådivås⁄s in Chhota Nagpur had been pressing for a state of 
their own. (The Chhota Nagpur Plateau is now largely within the boundaries of 
Jharkhand, which was carved off from Bihar to form a new state in 2000, but also 
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included parts of what are now Chhattisgarh, Orissa, and Bihar.) Several names had been 
floated for the proposed state (among them Adivasisthan), but the name that became most 
popular was Jharkhand (“Land of Forests”). Before independence, the movement was of 
little concern to Madhya Pradesh, but the Chhota Nagpur Plateau (and therefore the 
proposed Jharkhand) included the princely states of Raigarh, Udaipur, Surguja, Korea, 
and Jashpur, which had been merged into Madhya Pradesh in 1948 (Singh 1983: 10). The 
Jharkhand movement therefore threatened to peel off from Madhya Pradesh territory it 
had only recently assimilated. 
Christians associated with the Gossner Lutheran Mission and the Roman Catholic 
Church were involved in the Jharkhand movement from its inception. The German 
Gossner mission had been established in the late nineteenth century by the Catholic 
priest-turned-Protestant (Lutheran) John Evangelist Gossner (1773–1858). In 1841 he 
sent a missionary party of six to work among Gond ådivås⁄s in the region, but four of 
them died relatively quickly. In 1844 the Gossner mission sent four more missionaries to 
work among the Kols (another ådivås⁄ group) in what is today Bihar (Neill 1985: 354–
55). Eventually they established a lasting station at Ranchi (today the capitol of 
Jharkhand). The ådivås⁄ peasants (Gonds, Kols, Oraons, Mundas, Santhals) in the region 
were cruelly oppressed by their generally upper-caste landlords (zam⁄ndårs), who 
appeared to be in league with the judges—also upper-caste—which prevented the 
peasants from seeking legal redress. Though there were few converts initially, when the 
legal work of the missionaries on behalf of the dispossessed ådivås⁄s became more 
widely known, large numbers of ådivås⁄s began to convert. The first were converted in 
1850, and by 1857 (at the time of the Mutiny/War of Independence) there were already 
900 Christians on the mission (Tete 1984: 12). Many of these were in fact brought in to 
the mission not by foreign missionaries but by ådivås⁄ catechists, who had been trained 
by the mission. But they did not hide the fact that they sought missionary help in 
addressing their temporal problems (Tete 1984: 355–56).  
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Belgian Jesuits moving westward from Calcutta, where they were in charge of the West 
Bengal mission, were the first to work in the Chhota Nagpur region. Though other 
Catholics had been sent to the region as early as 1869, the true founder of the Catholic 
work in Chhota Nagpur was Father Constantine Lievens, S.J., who was sent to the region 
in 1885. Lievens mastered local land laws (British laws had not yet come fully into 
effect), and, as one Catholic history book put it, “this knowledge of the law became Fr. 
Lievens’ net to draw thousands of heathens into the Bark of Peter” (Capuchin Mission 
Unit 1923: 154). Lievens became famous for his legal advocacy, and in 1888 alone he 
christened more than 11,000 people and prepared 40,000 catechumens in 832 villages 
(Plattner 1957: 121). Later that year Lievens moved into the region of Barway, which had 
sent him a delegation indicating the whole region was ready to become Christian. Lievens 
helped the Oraon ådivås⁄s in the region in their struggle against the zam⁄ndårs and 
established his conditions: “If the whole village was ready to come over to…Catholicism 
he was willing to help them and so sometimes the whole village became Catholic. This he 
did because he wanted to make the whole of Barway region Catholic. He baptized in 
thousands so that people would find solidarity and would not fall back into paganism” 
(Tete 1984: 27). In three weeks he baptized 13,000 people and placed 10,000 more in 
preparation (Capuchin Mission Unit 1923: 134; Pothacamury 1957: 76). In 1927 the 
diocese of Ranchi was created. In 1951 it had its first Indian Bishop, an ådivås⁄, and in 
1952 Ranchi became a metropolitan see. By the time of the Niyogi Committee’s work 
there were in Chhota Nagpur over 300,000 ådivås⁄ Catholics (Pothacamury 1957: 76).  
In addition to their legal advocacy, both the Gossner and the Roman Catholic missions 
helped local ådivås⁄s form self-help collectives of various kinds. In 1872 the Gossner 
mission established the Chota Nagpur Christian Co-operative Bank. In 1893 a Catholic 
worker named Hoffman established the Chota Nagpur Catholic Co-operative Credit 
Society. In 1898 Lutheran graduates of Gossner schools formed the Chhota Nagpur 
Christian Association, which became the Christian College Union in 1918 when 
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Catholics joined. These associations were open only to Christians, but in 1912 the Chota 
Nagpur Charitable Association was established for all ådivås⁄s, Christian or not. Some 
years later a Lutheran student organized the Chota Nagpur Unnati Samaj. The Unnati 
Samaj’s most significant (but ultimately fruitless) work was petitioning the visiting 
British Simon Commission in 1928–29 for special privileges for the ådivås⁄s and a 
separate administrative unit for the Chota Nagpur region. Catholics formed the Chota 
Nagpur Catholic Sabha in 1936, which joined with the Unnati Samaj and a local farmers’ 
collective (the Kisan Sabha) in 1938 to form the Adivasi Mahasabha (on the history of 
these various organizations, see Ghosh 1998: 37–40; Ratan 1992: 108–10; Roy 1992: 97–
98; Singh 1983: 2–4).  
The constitution of the Adivasi Mahasabha, no longer merely a society of Christians 
but one with political aims, stated that: 
 
It is essential that these aboriginal districts forming as they do [a] compact area most 
intimately bound together as between themselves by racial, linguistic, cultural, 
historical and agrarian bonds should be constituted into a separate administrative unit, 
for the sake of furthering the racial, economic, educational, cultural and political 
interest of the backward people of this area (whose distinctive unity and whose right to 
separation from Bihar has in a way been admitted and recognised by the Simon 
Commission and the framers of the Government of India Act, 1935) (Report I.50).  
 
Having failed to be granted a “separate administrative unit” at the time of 
independence, the Mahasabha shifted its focus to more proximate goals. It protested the 
inclusion of Surguja and Jashpur in Madhya Pradesh, agitating instead for their inclusion 
in the state of Bihar (which had, at the time, a greater proportion of ådivås⁄s).  
In 1950 the Adivasi Mahasabha became the Jharkhand Party. In 1952 the party 
campaigned on a platform focused on gaining the ådivås⁄s their own state and won 
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several dozen seats. The founding president of the party was Jaipal Singh. Singh—a 
Munda who had been raised by Anglican missionaries, had studied at Oxford, and was on 
India’s Olympic gold medal-winning field hockey team in 1928—became a member of 
Parliament (Ghosh 1998: 40–41; Munda and Keshari 2003: 218). Many of the other 
officers of the party were Lutheran and Catholic Christians. In 1953, just before the 
Niyogi Committee began its work, the Jharkhand Party was petitioning the States Re-
organisation Commission asking for the establishment of a separate state of Jharkhand 
(Ghosh 1998: 42–43). (Since the commission conceived of regional cohesion largely in 
linguistic terms, and the ådivås⁄s of Chhota Nagpur did not share a common language, 
the petition was ultimately rejected.)  
Singh and the Jharkhand movement had the clear support, whether direct or indirect, of 
many Indian Christians and foreign missionaries in the region (Report I.10, II.A.349). 
One witness told the Niyogi Committee, “I am a Christian.…I attend [the Catholic] 
Gholeng Mission for prayers. After prayers, the foreign Missionaries of Gholeng preach 
against Hindu religion and state that Adivasis and Christians were still slaves and will be 
free only after they [get] Jharkhand” (Report II.B.127). Many Christian ådivås⁄s clearly 
looked forward to a Jharkhand ruled by Christians. The movement was by no means a 
merely Christian movement, though. By the 1950s support for the Jharkhand movement 
was widespread among ådivås⁄s and even among other communities in the region 
(Mullick 2003: vii). 
Many Hindus in the Chhattisgarh region of eastern Madhya Pradesh found the 
movement troubling for a number of reasons. The first of course was political. Here 
again, it appeared to them, Christians were entangled in a movement which threatened 
political disintegration—this time of the state of Madhya Pradesh. There was a more 
fundamental issue that troubled certain Hindus as well, though: the movement for 
Jharkhand implied a sharp distinction between ådivås⁄ peoples and Hindus (or at least 
upper-caste Hindus) that some Hindus rejected as illegitimate. In fact, some members of 
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the Niyogi Committee believed that missionaries in the region emphasized this 
distinction only in order to attract ådivås⁄s away from Hinduism and towards 
Christianity. That may have been true, in some cases, though the ådivås⁄s themselves 
clearly had reasons for distinguishing themselves from high-caste Hindu landowners, and 
many missionaries may have been echoing a distinction made by those with whom they 
worked. The issue of the extent to which the ådivås⁄s and ådivås⁄ religion can be said to 
be (or to have been) Hindu had been much debated by Hindus, ådivås⁄s, and scholars 
long before the Report was published and continues to be debated today (Dirks 2001). 
Nevertheless, the Report insists on the existence of a more sinister missionary agenda: 
that “In order to consolidate and enhance their prestige, and possibly to afford scope for 
alien interests in this tract, the Missionaries were reported to be carrying on propaganda 
for the isolation of the Aboriginals from other sections of the community and the 
movement of Jharkhand was started” (I.9).  
According to others, the rabbit hole, so to speak, went even deeper. The Report asserts: 
 
The separatist tendency that has gripped the mind of the aboriginals under the influence 
of the [Gossner] Lutheran and Roman Catholic Missions is entirely due to the 
consistent policy pursued by the British Government and the Missionaries. The final 
segregation of the aborigines in the Census of 1931 from the main body of the Hindus 
considered along with the recommendations of the Simon Commission which were 
incorporated in the Government of India Act, 1935, apparently set the stage for the 
demand of a separate State of Jharkhand on the lines of Pakistan (Report I.49). 
 
One of the most common perceptions recorded in the Report was that Christians were 
using the threat of a future Jharkhand state ruled by Christians in order to pressure non-
Christians to convert. One Deopatram, from Balrampur, near the Gossner and the 
Catholic centers at Ambikapur, complained, “missionaries try to influence me by saying 
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that shortly there will be Jharkhand raj of the Christians and they will give salt and cloth, 
etc., at cheap rates” (Report II.A.42). V. N. Dube, interviewed at Ambikapur, where 
Catholic missionaries were active, said, “Christians say that shortly they will have Father 
or Christian Raj and they will be driven out and only the Christian will remain there. 
Others will be driven away” (Report II.A.37, see also II.A.17, 42). 
 
Isaistan and American Neo-Colonialism 
 
Ultimately what many Hindus in the region feared about the Jharkhand movement was 
not merely that it would become an independent state, though that was reason enough for 
fear, but that it would become an independent Christian state with political priorities and 
loyalties at odds with those of India. Some Christians apparently were making it clear 
that this was what they desired, abandoning the name Jharkhand and calling instead for 
an independent Isaisthan,9 Massihisthan,10 Krististhan, or Christiansthan. A little farther 
west in Madhya Pradesh, in Amravati, the Niyogi Committee interviewed Shri Khaparde, 
an ex-minister, who said, “[In Gondia, where there was an American Methodist 
Episcopal mission] the President of the Christian Society declared that some day he 
hopes to have a Christiansthan in India, just as there is Pakistan there is to be 
Christiansthan, Budhistnan [sic], Jainisthan and how many more sthans I do not know.” 
Growing more serious he added, “This is a matter of alarm. We think that if the 
Christians conceive the idea of Christiansthan, then there is a great danger to the land 
being split and divided into small pieces and, thus, we are going to lose our [integrity, 
independence], self respect, religion, culture and all our past history” (Report II.A.86, see 
also II.A.128). Few, if any Christians interviewed denied that they wished for such a 
land. For example, in 1954, Masihi Awaz, a periodical printed by the Evangelical Mission 
in Raipur, declared (in Hindi), “In these [current] circumstances, would it not be fitting 
that some land be taken from both India and Pakistan in order to create a country for 
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Christians also along the lines of Pakistan?” (Report II.B.157; my translation). Here again 
it is uncertain whether Christians are calling for a state within the Indian Union or an 
independent country, along the lines of Pakistan. 
Witnesses were quick to compare the Jharkhand movement to those in Assam, Burma, 
and other parts of Asia. In its history of Christian missions, the Report itself declared: 
 
This attempt of the Adiwasis initiated by the Christian section thereof is a feature which 
is common to the developments in Burma, Assam and Indo-China among the Karens,11 
Nagas, and Amboynes. This is attributed to the spirit of religious nationalism awakened 
among the converted Christians as among the followers of other religions. But the idea 
of change of religion as bringing about change of nationality appears to have originated 
in the Missionary circles…(I.50–51). 
 
Worse yet, calls for an independent Isaisthan conjured up the specter of that worst of 
political disintegrations: Partition. Moreover, it was not merely on the eastern frontier of 
Madhya Pradesh that non-Christians worried about the possibility of an independent 
Christian state. Though the Jharkhand movement had never officially called for an 
autonomous nation, in response to the Committee’s questionnaire, T. Y. Dehankar, 
president of the Bar Association in Bilaspur, where Disciples of Christ missionaries were 
active, declared, “We have lately a bitter experience of the vivisection of our mother-
land. We do not want repetition in that regard” (Report II.A.315, see also II.A.86). 
Another witness, a Brahmin pleader from Jashpur, where Catholic and Gossner 
missionaries had worked, stated things more directly: “The idea of Jharkhand is on the 
lines of Pakistan. To this end, the Missionaries have been trying and before Pakistan was 
created they had close associations with the Muslim League”12 (Report II.B.134, see also 
II.B.157). In its recommendations the Report states, in a moment of self-reflective 
candor, “Cries of Christisthan or Massihisthan are foolish and dangerous. Young, 
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independent India, still smarting under memories of the partition of India on grounds of 
religion is very sensitive to anything dangerous to the solidarity and security of the 
country” (I.158, see also I.60). Not surprisingly, some viewed Christians as a potentially 
seditious fifth column. The Report asserts that “Missionary organisations are so wide-
spread in this country that they seem to constitute ‘a State within the State’ ” and goes on 
to suggest that such was the design of the pope, the National Christian Council of India, 
and/or the International Missionary Council (I.31).  
The conversion of Indians to Christianity, witnesses argued, also entailed their 
denationalization. This of course was not a new assertion. Savarkar defined a Hindu (that 
is, one who was truly welcome in India) as one who considers “Bharat-Bhoomi [the Land 
of India] from the Indus to the Seas as his father land and Holyland” (1949: 10). Implied 
in this definition is that converts to “foreign” religions (like Christianity and Islam) have 
extra-territorial loyalties and can therefore not be reliable citizens of India. 
Members of the Nagar Hindu Sabha in Pusad (District Yeotmal, now Maharashtra), in 
whose town a small Nazarene hospital had been founded, averred to the Niyogi 
Committee in a written statement, “By conversion, nationality is changed and there is no 
affection for mother country. Pakistan has come into [existence] because of conversion” 
(Report II.A.120, see also I.145, II.A.86, 141, 147, 283). Similarly, an advocate from 
Sagar, where the Swedish Evangelical Missionary Society had worked among the Gonds, 
testified, “At some crucial moment of real trial and stress for the security of Bharat 
[India] those who have outside affinities and outside affiliations may not prove helpful to 
the security of Bharat and it might lead to further division and disruption of our land. The 
happenings in Jharkhand and Assam are a pointer to this” (Report II.B.165).  
Christians in India were not merely denationalized, but imbued, according to many 
witnesses who appeared before the Niyogi Committee, with a profound and traitorous 
love of America and its culture. It is striking how quickly America replaced Britain as 
India’s great bogeyman. Of the 480 foreign missionaries in Madhya Pradesh at the time 
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of the Committee’s work, 236 were American (Report I.104). This great number of 
American missionaries in India was understood by some as part of America’s anti-
communist cold war strategy. In a chapter on “Christian Post-War World Policy” the 
Report explains, as it saw it, the reason for America’s interest in India: 
 
In view of the radical shift since 1945 in the International balance of power which has 
affected every country in Asia, [the United States] finds itself devoid of any Asian 
territory. She has partly compensated for this by establishing military bases on the 
Pacific fringe of Asia from Japan to the Philippines. The drive for proselytization in 
India is an attempt to acquire an additional base which of course would be 
psychological (I.58).  
 
Some witnesses were even convinced that missionaries taking photographs of mission 
stations from airplanes were in fact working covertly for United States’ military planners 
(Report II.A.116, 122, 135).  
The Report includes a chart submitted by T. Y. Dehankar, quoted above, which 
summarizes how he understood the relationship between America and the missionaries he 
met in Madhya Pradesh (II.A.302). I reproduce it here: 
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One of the ways that American missionaries worked towards the goal of political and 
cultural domination, some believed, was by establishing community projects (schools, 
hospitals, and so on) in which, according to witnesses, 
 
…they try to tell you that American way of life and American help alone can save you 
and that China and Russia are your enemies….It is their attempt to bring everything 
Indian into contempt and disrepute and try to impress the coloured people that they are 
sub-human, low and inferior and also convince Indians that they have no escape unless 
they follow and obey the white races. They seem to be keen on propagating the 
American way of life…(Report II.A.87). 
 
There were many Indian Christians involved in the struggle for independence and the 
vast majority of Christians were loyal, patriotic Indians. Yet for those anxious about the 
survival of the Indian nation, or those willing to exploit such anxieties for political gain, 
the evidence of a sinister Christian plan seemed obvious enough. The seemingly 
ubiquitous sign of American influence, wealth, and power even provoked an occasional 
outburst. One Christian, Isabux of Basna, an area of American Mennonite mission work, 
complained, “I have been troubled by American gang too much.…Here, there is 
American imperialism.…Money comes from America. I have moved in missionary melas 
[festivals]. They tell lies. They are mad after luxury. They will prove worse than the 
British. Mennonite is a gang” (Report II.A.12). 
 
Tolerance, Triumphalism, and “Christian” Imperialism 
 
To some witnesses, Christian America’s neo-colonial pretensions were but a 
manifestation of a larger problem. That problem was that Christianity was, around the 
world, an intrusive, meddling, and imperialistic religion. Few of the witnesses appearing 
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before the Committee put it quite that baldly, and the claim would seem downright 
preposterous, I imagine, to many Christian Americans, but the notion that Hindus mind 
their own business while Christians stick their noses in everyone else’s was a common 
one in this context, as was the similar and related assertion that Hinduism is tolerant 
whereas Christianity is triumphalistic.  
Here is where context is key. Christians frequently tend to use political and military 
metaphors to express their central hopes and beliefs. One need, for example, look no 
further than the Lord’s Prayer: “Thy kingdom come, thy will be done, on earth as it is in 
heaven.” Though such a political metaphor would rarely if ever appear in Hindu 
discourse, Hindus are not unfamiliar with the religious use of symbolic speech. It is 
therefore conceivable that in an apolitical environment a Hindu would understand a 
phrase like “Thy kingdom come” metaphorically. But there is of course no apolitical 
environment, and given the many threats to the integrity and survival of the Indian state 
outlined above and given the ever-increasing power and reach of Westerners and 
Christianity, one can imagine why such language would be perceived as a literal 
statement of ominous political goals.  
If military and political metaphors are common in Christian language, they are 
ubiquitous in twentieth-century Christian missionary rhetoric. The Report itself objects to 
the title of a Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society pamphlet, World Conquest Soon by 
God’s Kingdom, and to the practice of calling missionary groups “invasion teams” (I.57, 
see also I.140). In the context of postcolonial insecurity and power disparities it is not at 
all surprising that some Hindus would find such phrases disconcerting.  
One witness argued that “God’s kingdom on earth which the missionaries preach, 
means Christian Raj. But ours is not a Christian Raj. Missionaries may be using idiomatic 
language in their prachar [preaching], but it has adverse effect on our illiterate brothers” 
(Report II.A.141). Another complained that he had heard Christians sing a song in Hindi 
which translated as “Hindustan will be won for Christ.” “All Government officers were 
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present,” he said. “We understood the meaning of the function and the song as ‘though 
the Britishers have gone, Americans want to rule the country’ ” (Report II.A.92). (A 
foreign missionary who had attended the same function was present at the hearing and 
did not deny the lyrics of the song.)  
Given the tendency of local Hindus to take such triumphalist terminology at face value, 
the Report urges missionaries to be careful about their language: “Even terms like 
‘Kingdom of God’ must be explained in their true spiritual sense in order to obviate the 
hurting of any susceptibility. How much more should Christians dissociate themselves 
from demands for a Jharkhand State or an Adivasisthan?” (I.159). Christians interviewed 
responded in various ways. One group of foreign missionaries associated with the 
Swedish Evangelical Missionary Society in Betul (which was by this time under control 
of the Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church of Madhya Pradesh) explained, “We speak of 
‘Thy Kingdom’ but we do not mean any worldly kingdom. We mean the Kingdom of 
God in Heaven” (Report II.A.167). An Indian Roman Catholic preacher from Lunda, who 
the transcriber notes was “having a chuti” (a shaven head with a tuft of hair at the back—
a sign of Bråhma~ical orthodoxy), responded as well, saying “We have no instructions to 
preach politics. We simply speak of religion and not politics.” But notice, as he 
continues, how political his religion really was: “We say there is God’s raj. You find out 
his religion and you will get it. We need not worry about anything. In God’s Raj 
everybody will have everything” (Report II.A.47). 
Christians spoke often, too, of their primary loyalty to Christ. Such language, in 
combination with already existing fears about the denationalization of Christian converts, 
seemed to confirm the impression that Christians could not be loyal and patriotic citizens 
of India. Hindu members of the Niyogi Committee were struck by phrases in missionary 
literature such as “colony of heaven,” “in the country but not of the country,” and 
“historical community of the redeemed” (I.144). Assertions that the Christian Church was 
“World Wide,” “Supra-national,” and “Supra-racial,” common in ecumenical and 
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evangelical circles at the time, suggested to writers of the Report that “Christians in a 
State owed double allegiance.…Ordinarily there might be no clash, but in case there was 
a conflict of loyalties between Christ and State, the true Christian had necessarily to 
choose obedience to Christ” (I.57, see also 144, 147). 
Some members of the committee interpreted the phrase “Partnership in obedience,” 
made famous by the 1947 meeting of the International Missionary Council in Whitby, in 
a similar vein. Whereas for members of the International Missionary Council the phrase 
embodied their hopes of dismantling paternalistic and Western-dominated institutional 
structures in missionary lands, Hindus understood it, at best, to indicate extra-territorial 
loyalties and, at worst, to suggest that there would be a partnership in which Indians 
would obey foreign Christians, something similar to the “Subsidiary Alliance which the 
conquering British had with the Nizam [of Hyderabad]” (Report I.150, 144). 
A school play put on by the Methodist Johnson Girls’ School in Jabalpur managed to 
offend a number of witnesses who came before the Niyogi Committee. A Hindu student 
at the school described the objectionable scene in the play: 
 
During the course of the drama, the four quarters of the world were represented by four 
directional winds which brought their flags, one representing Pakistan, another 
representing England, third America and the fourth representing India, i.e., the Indian 
National Flag. After some dialogue, the Indian Flag was hoisted. Then, after some time, 
some sound was heard from behind the stage and then one holy person came and she 
said “We wish that there should be peace in the whole world.” Then a girl came with a 
flag having the sign of the Cross. Then that flag was hoisted on the top of all the other 
flags. This would bring peace in the world and it would be hoisted all over the world. I 
and other Hindu girls felt that this was a disrespect to our National Flag (Report 
II.B.142). 
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In response, Miss Zilla Soule, the school’s principal, defended the drama, saying that it 
had been approved by the entire staff which included Hindu and Muslim teachers and 
that, furthermore, the Indian national flag was the only one on stage which had not been 
made of paper. Nevertheless, notice again how in the perception of these and other 
Hindus, the common Christian assertion that allegiance to Christ trumps allegiance to any 
and all worldly powers is heard instead as a pledge of allegiance to a future worldwide 
Christian empire. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Members of the Niyogi Committee found one visual image particularly troubling, and the 
reasons why are instructive. The image to which the Report refers is from the cover of the 
October 1947 edition of a Catholic periodical, Nishkalank.13 On the left side, extending 
from nearly the bottom to the top of the page, is the Virgin Mary shown in flowing robes 
(see Figure 1). Her head is bowed graciously as she looks down and to the right. In her 
left arm she cradles the baby Jesus. Both she and Jesus are encircled by halos, and their 
arms extend forth, palms earthward, toward a map of Chhota Nagpur which appears at 
their feet.  
 
 
Figure 1: 
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Later in the issue a textual explanation of the image is given: 
 
When will the Ranchi Holy Land be dedicated to the Mother Maria? Oh, the Queen of 
Chhota Nagpur, by your grace Christ-king entered this land with splendour and 
established his residence here. Oh, thou Virgin of the Resurrection, at this moment, 
when false prophets are trying to appropriate Chhota Nagpur, enter thy kingdom with 
triumph and invite the Hindus, (unconverted) Lutherans, Anglicans and others to be 
with you and your son (Report I.A.51). 
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The Report cites the image and text as proof that Catholics were supporting the 
Jharkhand movement. But is it?  
Most Christians seeing this image, particularly in conjunction with the text, would, I 
imagine, interpret them both as an articulation of the Christian desire to see the people of 
Jharkhand become Christian. The pose would be understood as a suggestion of humble 
benevolence, and the hand gesture as a blessing. The “dedication” referred to in the text 
would be taken as a spiritual one and the “false prophets” as those who oppose 
Christianity. Mary is the “Queen” of heaven (not Chhota Nagpur), and Jesus is the 
“Christ-king” of a spiritual kingdom, though Christians would assert that he also has 
power, should he wish to wield it, over the earth (not associated with any particular 
temporal power). The phrase “enter thy kingdom with triumph,” though clearly 
sensational, would be read by most Christians as a request that the Virgin provide 
spiritual support to Christian evangelistic efforts. 
But given political concerns about the potential disintegration of both Madhya Pradesh 
and the Indian nation, it is perhaps not surprising that it might be read differently. Once 
again, the triumphalist language used by Nishkalank’s authors makes a more sinister 
reading of the text possible. Mary is after all called a “Queen,” and Jesus the “Christ-
king.” Moreover, there is no particular reason why one need interpret the “dedication” 
mentioned in the text as a spiritual one. The Virgin is asked to enter her kingdom “with 
triumph.” And the “false prophets” are unidentified. Are they, as Christians might 
understand it, opponents of Christianity, or are the “false prophets” Hindus or social and 
political leaders who opposed the Jharkhand independence movement? Read in this way, 
the text would be perceived to suggest that the Virgin and Jesus are not so much blessing 
Chhota Nagpur as asserting their authority (read: Christian authority) over it. The region 
does appear, after all, at their feet in a position symbolic in India of submission (one 
greets one’s elders, for example, by crouching at and touching their feet).  
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It is of course possible that such a reading is a more accurate reflection of the intentions 
of those who created the image and authored the text. Perhaps there were members of the 
Nishkalank staff who wished to use it in support of the Jharkhand movement. Editorial 
policy, fear, or caution may have encouraged them to do so indirectly, veiling their 
political ambitions in the language of religion. The point I wish to emphasize here, 
though, is that no matter how innocent the intentions of those who produced this 
document, the political and social climate was such that it could not but have been read 
by some Hindus as a statement of Christian imperialistic aims.14 
We will probably never know the intentions of those who produced this image and its 
accompanying text. What this discussion does demonstrate, however, is the importance of 
context. These days it is not unusual to suggest that one’s situation influences one’s 
perspective, and the term “perspective” itself implies as much. Whatever the source of 
contemporary Indian discomfort with missionaries and Christian conversion, it was, in 
this context, not so much about religion per se as it was about politicized religion (if the 
two can ever be distinguished). It was about religion as the basis of a political and 
communal identity. Ambivalence about and hostility towards Christian conversion in this 
context must therefore be seen not so much as a reflection of concern for spiritual souls 
(or selves, as the case may be) so much as a competition for (Hindu) bodies, political 
bodies, bodies which constituted, according to Hindu nationalists, the grounds of Indian 
unity and therefore needed to be preserved in order to preserve the unity of India itself. 
Yet again, there was for many Hindu nationalists something about the nature of Hindu 
spirituality itself which allowed for and contributed to this imagined and hoped-for 
national unity, and so the distinction between concern for souls and concern for bodies 
may be, on at least one level, an artificial one.  
Moreover, I am not suggesting that the intentions of Christian missionaries were 
spiritual and religious while those of Hindu nationalists were material and political. In 
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fact, drawing on evidence from the Report, Arun Shourie argues that from the very 
beginning of Christian history: 
 
Jesus was overshadowed by the Church; and since then the Church has become 
preoccupied with itself. The…objectives its members have pursued have not [been] to 
live the life of Jesus, but the objectives characteristic of most secular organisations—
numbers, market shares, the debates over one marketing strategy over another, the 
weighing of rituals, even of which aspect of the doctrine is to be emphasised and which 
is to [be] underplayed in the light of what effect either is liable to have on the market 
share. The sacred secularised, from St. Francis of Assisi to a marketing agency…(2007: 
19)  
 
Whether Shourie’s analysis is correct is not my concern. The point, rather, is that in a 
context of politicized religious identities, of religion as the basis for communal identities, 
both sides of this conflict view each other as being concerned purely with numbers and 
therefore with political gain.  
Hindu nationalists have been more open than Christians, perhaps, about their concern 
for numbers. Islam and Christianity are both explicitly missionary religions, and at least 
since Lieutenant Colonel U. N. Mukerji’s letters, “Hindus: A Dying Race,” appeared in 
the Bengalee (1909) and raised the specter of Hindu extinction, some Hindus have found 
the growth of Christian and Muslim populations troubling, fearing that Hinduism, which 
they perceive to be non-proselytizing, would eventually be swamped by the growth of 
these “foreign” religions.15 
That concern persists even to the present day. In Paravartan Back to Hinduism: Why 
and How (1999), Raj Eshwar asserts, “History is witness to the fact that in whichever part 
of India the percentage of Hindu population declined, it was cut off from the national 
mainstream and eventually seceded from the country” (an excerpt of the text appears in 
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Jaffrelot 2007: 245). As Sita Ram Goel put it in his introduction to the reprinting of the 
Report in 1998, Christianity “has never been a religion; its long history tells us that it has 
always been a predatory imperialism par excellence” (3). Moreover, “theological blah 
blah notwithstanding, the fact remains that [Christian] dogma is no more than a 
subterfuge for forging and wielding an organizational weapon for mounting unprovoked 
aggression against other people” (Goel 1998: 3). In addition, according to Goel, 
Jawaharlal Nehru was, because of his support for secularist policies and rejection of anti-
conversion legislation, “a coolie carrying the White Man’s Burden” (1998: 7). One can 
therefore still clearly see today (as in the 1950s), how thoroughly entangled are the issues 
of conversion, secularism, identity, and national unity. I have not sought in this article to 
evaluate, judge, or condemn anti-conversion sentiment in the 1950s, but rather to analyze 
and interpret it with reference to its context of regional and national instability and 
postcolonial imbalances of wealth and power in such a way that this analysis might also, 
if only by inference, inform contemporary Hindu-Christian tensions as well. 
 
Notes 
 
1. I would like to thank those who attended the 2006 annual meeting of the Society for 
Hindu-Christian Studies for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of the article 
which I presented there. I would also like to thank students attending my 2007 course, 
“Religion, Politics, and Conflict in South Asia,” at Butler University for helpful feedback 
on a version of the article I mercilessly forced them to read. Finally, I am grateful to the 
three anonymous reviewers for their insightful criticisms and suggestions.  
2. Ambedkar, the Columbia University educated lawyer, was the most prominent of 
Indian dalit leaders in the first half of the twentieth century and converted from Hinduism 
to Buddhism in 1956 to protest the former’s treatment of the lowest castes (Jaffrelot 
2005; Queen 1996). 
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3. Francis Clooney, S.J., Parkman Professor of Divinity and Professor of Comparative 
Theology at Harvard University and past president of the American Academy of 
Religion, has recently and unintentionally, for example, been drawn into the fray (Menon 
2006). 
4. This version of the Report is a reprint. It is an exact duplicate, and retains the 
organization and pagination, of the original.  
5. Jinnah was the most prominent of Indian Muslim leaders in the late colonial period 
and served both as the president of the All-India Muslim League and as Pakistan’s first 
governor-general.  
6. The Report can also be found online at http://www.bharatvani.org/books/ncr/.  
7. The regularity of claims of kidnapping and abduction is particularly astounding. 
8. This Udaipur should not be confused with the city of the same name in Rajasthan. 
9. “Ûså⁄” means “Christian” in Hindi. 
10. “Mas⁄h” means “Messiah” in Hindi. 
11. The Karens had pressed for a separate state of Burma at the Round Table 
Conference in 1930, and in 1937 Burma became a colony administered separately from 
India (Wolpert 1997: 322).  
12. Feeling somewhat marginalized by the Indian National Congress, the Adivasi 
Mahasabha, precursor to the Jharkhand Party, did indeed make an alliance with the 
Muslim League around the time of Partition. The Muslim League was at the time 
considering pressing for a corridor linking what became East and West Pakistan. The 
corridor would have moved through Chhota Nagpur (Mullick 2003: xv). 
13. The image actually appeared on the front page of every issue from June to 
November in 1947. Thanks to George Gispert-Sauch, S.J., for making me aware of this 
and for securing a copy of the image for me from the Vidyajyoti College of Theology 
library in Delhi. 
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14. It is interesting that Christians have from the beginning been accused of divided 
loyalties. Jesus himself was crucified ostensibly for claiming to be the “King of the 
Jews,” and early Christians were persecuted on the grounds that they would not 
participate in rituals expressing loyalty to the emperor.  
15. For an argument against the notion that Hinduism is and always has been non-
proselytizing, see Sarkar (2007).  
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